CEPE/IACAP Joint Conference 2021 - Abstract Submission and Registration

Session

Artificial Moral Agents

10

Not scheduled

105. AI Personhood Mapped Via a Continuum

Individual Paper

It is an important and pressing question whether personhood ought to be adopted as a legal status for artificial intelligence systems (AI systems). I argue that conceptualizing artificial intelligence agency on a continuum rather than in binary terms allows the implications of the adoption of legal personhood status for artificial agents to be more appropriately framed.

This paper is thus...

86. Should We Consider a Robot to be a (Moral) Agent?

Dr Marcus Düwell (Minstroom Research BV)

Individual Paper

There are different views on the morally relevant capacities of robots. While some regard robots to be basically advanced forms of computers, others consider them rather to be agent to which we can ascribe responsibility, that we should treat with respect and ascribe rights to them. In this paper we investigate the moral status of robots with two methodological tools. In a first step, we will...

90. There Is Still At Least One Reason for Making Artificial Moral Agents

Individual Paper

I argue that there is at least one reason for making artificial moral agents, contrary to Aimee van Wynsberghe’s and Scott Robbins’ argument (2019). Van Wynsberghe and Robbins argue that for any machine, whether they are autonomous or not, only its safety feature is enough. I argue, on the contrary, that when a machine is complex enough and is autonomous, the “safety” quality of the machine...